Archive for the ‘Uncategorized’ Category

Rich Bernstein’s 2010 Things to watch

December 18, 2009

Here are my 10 guesses for how the financial markets will shape up in 2010.

1. Stock and bond market returns in the US will again be positive.

2. The US dollar is likely to meaningfully appreciate once market-driven short-term rates begin to rise.

3. US dollar “carry trades” could get killed as 2010 progresses and the US dollar appreciates.  Once accounting for leverage, hedge fund performance will likely trail long-only equity performance.

4. The Fed will spend the second half of the year trying to catch up to, and flatten, the yield curve.  Short-term rates could increase more than investors currently think.  Long-term rates could rise quite a bit in the first part of the year as inflation finally begins to appear, but are likely to fall during the second half of the year when the markets realize the Fed is serious about fighting inflation.  The curve is likely to be much flatter one year from today than it is currently.

5. Corporate profits are likely to explode to the upside during 2010.  Trailing four-quarter S&P 500 reported earnings growth could exceed 100%.  Investors still seem to be under-estimating the operating and financial leverage that is built into corporate profits.

6. Employment in the US will probably continue to improve.  Consumer Discretionary stocks will likely be among the best performing sectors.

7. Treasuries will probably underperform stocks.  That underperformance is unfortunately likely to reinforce both individual and institutional investors’ views that it is wise to be under-diversified.

8. Small cap value, I think, will be the US’s best performing size/style segment.  Small banks outperformance might be the biggest surprise for 2010.

9. Financial regulation will progress, but the bull market will probably aid politicians’ “forgetfulness”.  As a result, new regulation could be relatively meaningless.  In my opinion, serious regulation won’t occur until after the next downturn, which could be worse if no meaningful new regulation is implemented in 2010.

10. I think the Democrats will do better in the 2010 mid-term elections than people currently think they will.  It seems very likely to me that in December 2010, investors will look back on the year and realize that monetary and fiscal policy stimulus still works.

Comstock’s Bearish for 2010

December 18, 2009
WHY COMSTOCK REMAINS BEARISH
18 DECEMBER 2009 BY TPC 9 COMMENTS
The following is a guest contribution from Comstock Partners:
The stock market rally has now reached a point where it is forecasting a V-shaped recovery that is not likely to happen.  The recent catalyst for all of this optimism is a bullish interpretation of current economic activity, some apparent stabilization in the housing market and various companies beating earnings estimates.  Also not to be overlooked is the perceived strength of the Chinese economy that is affecting global growth and the upward move in some basic commodities.  We think that all of these points are being exaggerated while the fear of missing the train leaving the station is resulting in a speculative surge that is likely to leave the majority disappointed.
The key factor to consider is that the so-called ‘great recession’ was caused by a credit crisis following an artificial boom and therefore bears more resemblance to the great depression following 1929 or Japan after 1989.than it does to the series of recessions experienced in the post World War ll period.  After the collapse of the dot-com boom in 2000-to-2002 the Fed held interest rates at historically low levels for an extended period of time, and with the help of lax mortgage standards, complex securitized financial instruments and irresponsible ratings agencies, fostered a climate that resulted in a massive housing boom.  Households were able to cash out their vastly increased home values through refinancing and home equity loans that allowed them to spend freely and reduce their savings even though wage growth was exceedingly sluggish.  The consumer boom also led to the global buildup of capacity to satisfy the demand that was artificially induced by the free flow of credit that was mistaken for an abundance of liquidity by most economists and strategists.
Now the piper must be paid.  Despite the deep recession into early Summer, the consumer is still being forced to adjust to a far lower level of spending.  When that level is eventually reached the economy can again grow in a robust manner, but we are not near that point now.  The massive fiscal and monetary stimulation put into effect over the last nine months has mitigated the credit crisis and prevented a global collapse, but has not avoided the need for the economy to readjust to a new set of circumstances.  We are still faced with historically high debt levels, a low household savings rate and a subdued housing industry.  Reducing debt and getting the savings rate up will take an extended period of time.  Furthermore, as a result of reduced consumer spending there is also an excess of capacity that will impede capital expenditures as well.  And let’s not forget that foreign nations that have become dependent on the U.S. consumer for growth (read China) will have to find another way.
To briefly illustrate the nature of the adjustments ahead, consider the following.  From 1955 to 1985 consumer spending accounted for between 61% and 64% of GDP.  On September 30, this percentage had risen to 71%, an amount that is unsustainable given the artificiality of the boom that caused it.  For the percentage to drop to a more traditional 65% of GDP, spending would have to decline by 7.8%. While this will not happen all at once, it will be a drag on consumer spending for some time to come.
Similar reasoning is applicable to household debt and savings.  Household debt has averaged 57% of GDP over the last 55 years and was still at 64% as late as 1995.  It has since soared to 98.6% (only slightly under its peak) giving a big boost to spending.  Even if debt remains at a high level the absence of any further increase takes away a significant past source of growth.
The household savings rate mostly stayed in a range of between 7% and 11% of consumer disposable income in the decades prior to 1992, and steadily declined to around zero by 2008 before rising to a current 4.4% as consumers have started the process of reining in spending..  In the absence of rising home values and the virtual disappearance of mortgage equity withdrawals that, at its peak, accounted for an annualized 12% of consumer spending, the savings rate could easily climb back to more traditional 9%.  This would be yet another drag on spending.
In our view the economic recovery is on life support and is unsustainable.  The progress seen to date is almost entirely dependent on temporary government programs that are due to be wound down.  As that occurs the economy will be unable to expand on its own.    Highly unfavorable conditions in three key areas—housing, commercial real estate and consumer spending—make it highly likely that economic growth will be extremely tepid or fall into another recession.
About 25% of all homes with mortgages are underwater with about half of these 20% under and more.  Experience indicates that a large number of these mortgages will end up defaulting if they haven’t already done so.  Even now 14% of all homes with mortgages are in default or foreclosure.  Home prices have climbed slightly over the past few months only as a result of the first-time homebuyers’ tax credit and the fact that foreclosures have been temporarily backlogged as mortgage servicers have been determining who is eligible for modifications.  When this process is soon completed those not qualifying will be thrown into foreclosure.  In addition we are also facing another round of adjustable-rate mortgage resets that will result in even more defaults and foreclosures in the period ahead.  When this happens home prices will resume their decline, putting even more mortgages under water.  Let’s not forget that increasing unemployment and lack of new hiring will result in more households that are unable to keep up their payments.
Commercial real estate (CRE) is another area that will subject financial institutions and the economy to further risk.  CRE prices are already down 33% in 2009 and 45% from the peak with an estimated 55%-to-65% at prices lower than the amount of their mortgages.  About $1.5 trillion of CRE mortgages mature over the next few years, and a substantial number of them will not qualify for refinancing unless already weakened financial intuitions take a big hit.  A large number of the mortgage holders are small-to-medium sized community banks.  This is another reason why these banks are so reluctant to make new loans to small business.
The third leg of the shaky economic stool is the subdued outlook for consumer spending.  As we pointed out in our special report on deleveraging, consumers are in the process of paring down debt and increasing their savings rate, a process that has barely started.  The household debt/GDP ratio is still close to100% compared to a 57-year median of 57%.  While the household savings rate has increased to 4.4% from near zero, it generally averaged between 8% and 9% in the decades prior to 1992.  While an increased savings rate benefits the economy in the long-term it tends to dampen consumer spending while the process is underway.  Also hampering consumer spending is the fact that wages are down 5% from a year ago, unemployment is still rising, new hiring is still declining, net worth has plunged and consumer credit is tight.  Consumer credit outstanding has dropped 4.3% over the past year, the most in at least 44 years.  Household net worth has declined 12% year-over-year, the most in 57 years.
Another ominous development is the recent emergence of sovereign debt problems.  The revelation of Dubai World’s inability to pay its debts on time resulted in a one-day market drop that was soon easily dismissed as one-off event.  After the initial blithe dismissal of the emergence of subprime mortgage problems, the world should have learned that such events never occur in a vacuum.  After a world-wide debt binge based on the theory that assets can only rise in value, an unexpected severe decline in asset values leaves debtors with too little cash flow to service their debts.  It was therefore naïve to think that Dubai would be the only nation impacted, and, sure enough, the other shoes have started to fall.  Fitch lowered their rating on Greece to BBB and S&P followed with a change in Spain’s outlook to negative on its current AA+ rating.  The firm had already downgraded Portuguese bonds a few days earlier.  The distress in Greece, Portugal and Spain place the ECB in a tough position.  The central bank has to do what is best for all 16 member nations as a whole, and when they tighten monetary policy the stresses on the weak members gets even worse.  We would not be surprised to see other nations in debt trouble as well, both in the ECB and any where else on the globe
We believe that U.S. government and private debt levels will diverge over the next four or five years as the authorities attempt to use government debt to replace the private debt that is almost certain to decline substantially.  U.S. total debt is presently just under $55 trillion, comprised of public (government) debt of about $15 trillion and private debt (U.S. corporations and individuals) of about $40 trillion.  The similarities to Japan at its 1989 economic and market peak leads us to believe that we are close to the same road map that Japan was on starting at that time and continuing until today.  With that said, we expect current U.S. government debt of $15 trillion to double to about $30 trillion and private debt to drop in half to about $20 trillion over the next 4-5 years.
The similarities between Japan’s deleveraging since 1989 and the U.S. presently are eerie.  Japan’s total debt to GDP increased from 270% when their secular bear market started to just about 350% 8 years later (1998) before declining to 110% presently.  The U.S. increased their total debt to GDP from 275% of GDP when our secular bear market started in 2000 to 375% presently (10 years later), and we suspect the total debt to decline similar to Japan’s even though the Japanese government debt tripled during their deleveraging.  The government debt relative to GDP was about 50% in both the U.S. and Japan when the secular bear market started.  We also suspect that our government debt will grow substantially just like it did in Japan as the private debt collapses.  The private debt in Japan decreased substantially from the peak 7 years after the secular bear market started (dropping from 270% of GDP to 110% presently).  If the U.S. were to follow Japan’s deflationary road map, we would expect our government debt to increase from about $7 trillion (net government debt not including the debt used to fund Social Security) to about $21 trillion and the private debt to decrease from about $39 trillion to around $20 trillion.  Also, the Japanese stock market doubled during the three years preceding their secular bear market in 1987, 1988, and 1989 while the U.S. market also doubled during the three years preceding the beginning of our secular bear market in 1997, 1998, and 1999.
All in all, the recession we have experienced is not a typical post-war decline, but the end of an era, and getting the economy back on its long-term growth trajectory will take an extended period of time.  For the stock market this means a reduced level of corporate earnings and subdued price-to-earnings ratios.  In this light we think that the big earnings increases forecast for 2010 are far too high.  It is likely the recent rally has gone about as far as it can go without some proof that the economy can recover at a strong pace, and we think that this proof is not likely to come anytime soon.
Source: Comstock

Goldman’s 2010 Commodity Outlook

December 18, 2009

Despite the fact that Goldman Sachs isn’t exactly the most popular bank on Wall Street these days there is no denying the fact that their trading desk is a money machine.  Much of that is due to their spectacular trading in commodities.  In addition to their favorite trades for 2010 (see here for the full details) Goldman also recently released their outlook for commodities in the coming year.  Their outlook for a rather robust global economy is in-line with their continued bullish view of the commodity markets.  Easy money and stronger than expected demand should help to keep many of the recent trends alive.  Full details follow:

  • Oil: A slow developed markets recovery amid an emerging markets revolution

Price target: $90

Potential profit: 20%+

  • Natural gas: Lowering our forecast on the back of delayed production declines

Price target: $6

Potential profit: 4%

  • Base metals: Urbanization is broadly supportive but extraction generates
    differentiation

Price targets:

Copper – $8,100 mt

Potential profit: 15%+

  • Precious metals: US Fed on hold leaves gold room to run

Price target:

Gold ‘10 – $1350

Potential profit: 20%+

Silver ‘10 – $20

Potential profit: 15%+


  • Agriculture: It’s still all about weather, but ongoing structural demand shifts in
    corn should prove supportive

Price target:

Wheat – $600

Potential profit: 15%+

Corn – $475

Potential profit: 18%

  • Livestock: Economic recovery suggests rising meat demand amid tighter supplies

Pretty bullish.

Merrill’s 2010 Outlook

December 15, 2009

We are just about finished wrapping up our series on 2010 outlooks.  In this article we’ll outline Bank of America Merrill Lynch.   Bank of America Merrill Lynch is very bullish heading into 2010 (an outlook similar to RBC).  They see many of the trends of 2009 continuing into 2010 and driving equity markets around the world higher by double digits (see JP Morgan’s bullish emerging market outlook here).   Ethan Harris, head of North American economics summarized the Merrill outlook:

“We believe the global economy will gather momentum in 2010.  We think that the unprecedented mix of near-zero interest rates and high budget deficits will engineer an economic recovery that is real and sustainable. We aren’t forecasting a swift return to robust growth. In fact, the recovery will likely lag behind those of previous recessions – but we believe that the world economy will perform far better than the economic consensus would indicate.”

This macro outlook is underpinned by a number of variables:

  • Global growth will be 4.4%, Chinese growth will be 10.1% and U.S. growth will be 3.2% – all above 2010 consensus estimates.
  • Inflation will remain benign.
  • U.S. stocks will rise 15% led by strong growth in global cyclical sectors – tech, energy, industrials and materials.  Financials are also expected to perform well as the yield curve remains conducive to strong earnings.
  • The MSCI All-Country World Index will rise 20 percent.
  • Gold and oil will both continue to rally as strong demand from foreign investors remains the primary driver.  Gold will breach $1,500 and oil will surpass $100.
  • Government bonds will perform poorly.
  • The Dollar & Yen will rally against the Euro.

Merrill also notes 10 key investment themes for 2010.  From PR Newswire:

10 Investment Themes for 2010

  • Government Balance Sheet Risk: The soaring U.S. budget deficit and a Chinese currency revaluation will drive 10-year U.S. Treasury yields above 4 percent by year-end 2010. Shorter-duration Treasuries and U.S. investment-grade corporate credit are less susceptible to such risks.
  • Rising Taxation: The soaring U.S. budget deficit, looming U.S. healthcare reform and a likely second stimulus package will need to be funded through higher tax rates. Opportunities include essential purpose revenue and general obligation municipal bonds, and municipal bond exchange-traded funds.
  • Alternative Dividend Yield Strategies: Dividend taxes are likely to rise in 2011, and as the prospect of higher taxes erodes the popularity of traditional dividend yield-oriented strategies, tax-advantaged or tax-deferred strategies will benefit.
  • Financial Sector Rehabilitation: Steepening yield curves around the world, increased M&A activity and the still-underestimated normalized earnings power of financials should foster their returns surprise on the upside. Opportunities can be found in best-of-breed mega-cap global financials.
  • Corporate Cash Flow Beneficiaries: High cash balances will translate into strategic M&A, a term describing non-speculative, non-private equity mergers. In addition, companies will increase capital spending and possibly dividends. We expect the beneficiaries of capital spending to include the industrial sector and temporary staffing companies as production expands.
  • Rising Global Growth: The global policy stimulus seen in 2009 will continue to support global growth led by emerging markets, while in the U.S. an inventory restocking cycle and higher capex converge to push global growth well above 4 percent. Opportunities include best-of-breed mega-cap multinationals based in developed markets with a large presence in emerging markets.
  • The Emerging Market Consumer: The emerging market consumer is at the beginning, not the end, of the credit cycle. Opportunities include emerging market currencies versus the U.S. dollar and, in equities, U.S. energy stocks, global energy majors and mega-cap multinationals.
  • Commodity Price Inflation: Supply constraints are likely to resurface in the year ahead as commodity demand outpaces the productive capacity of current resources. Investment opportunities include long positions in gold and global energy stocks.
  • Alternative Energy: Truly economical renewables may be years away, but investment in alternative energy is an important secular theme that will continue to gain ground. Alternative energy ETFs offer exposure to the burgeoning industry while providing important diversification across multiple technologies and business models. Old technology energy equities such as utilities will be a source of, not a beneficiary of, alternative energy investment.
  • The Return of Active Management: Volatility has come down in 2009, especially since central banks began their critical quantitative easing in March. Lower volatility leads to lower correlation, resulting in greater differentiation in asset price performance. The trend favors active over passive management. Such a stock-picking environment should result in high-quality, best-of-breed stocks outperforming in 2010.

“Poor returns from the equities markets over the past decade, particularly from large cap equities, have created a pessimism bubble among investors,” said Bianco. “We believe the S&P 500 is now undervalued, which could create many investment opportunities in the year ahead. Given our expectations for global growth led by emerging economies, a slow but steady U.S. recovery, and healthy S&P 500 EPS growth, we think that the pessimism bubble will finally burst in 2010.”

Buffett’s op-ed piece in NYT

August 20, 2009
August 19, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor

The Greenback Effect

By WARREN E. BUFFETT

Omaha

IN nature, every action has consequences, a phenomenon called the butterfly effect. These consequences, moreover, are not necessarily proportional. For example, doubling the carbon dioxide we belch into the atmosphere may far more than double the subsequent problems for society. Realizing this, the world properly worries about greenhouse emissions.

The butterfly effect reaches into the financial world as well. Here, the United States is spewing a potentially damaging substance into our economy — greenback emissions.

To be sure, we’ve been doing this for a reason I resoundingly applaud. Last fall, our financial system stood on the brink of a collapse that threatened a depression. The crisis required our government to display wisdom, courage and decisiveness. Fortunately, the Federal Reserve and key economic officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations responded more than ably to the need.

They made mistakes, of course. How could it have been otherwise when supposedly indestructible pillars of our economic structure were tumbling all around them? A meltdown, though, was avoided, with a gusher of federal money playing an essential role in the rescue.

The United States economy is now out of the emergency room and appears to be on a slow path to recovery. But enormous dosages of monetary medicine continue to be administered and, before long, we will need to deal with their side effects. For now, most of those effects are invisible and could indeed remain latent for a long time. Still, their threat may be as ominous as that posed by the financial crisis itself.

To understand this threat, we need to look at where we stand historically. If we leave aside the war-impacted years of 1942 to 1946, the largest annual deficit the United States has incurred since 1920 was 6 percent of gross domestic product. This fiscal year, though, the deficit will rise to about 13 percent of G.D.P., more than twice the non-wartime record. In dollars, that equates to a staggering $1.8 trillion. Fiscally, we are in uncharted territory.

Because of this gigantic deficit, our country’s “net debt” (that is, the amount held publicly) is mushrooming. During this fiscal year, it will increase more than one percentage point per month, climbing to about 56 percent of G.D.P. from 41 percent. Admittedly, other countries, like Japan and Italy, have far higher ratios and no one can know the precise level of net debt to G.D.P. at which the United States will lose its reputation for financial integrity. But a few more years like this one and we will find out.

An increase in federal debt can be financed in three ways: borrowing from foreigners, borrowing from our own citizens or, through a roundabout process, printing money. Let’s look at the prospects for each individually — and in combination.

The current account deficit — dollars that we force-feed to the rest of the world and that must then be invested — will be $400 billion or so this year. Assume, in a relatively benign scenario, that all of this is directed by the recipients — China leads the list — to purchases of United States debt. Never mind that this all-Treasuries allocation is no sure thing: some countries may decide that purchasing American stocks, real estate or entire companies makes more sense than soaking up dollar-denominated bonds. Rumblings to that effect have recently increased.

Then take the second element of the scenario — borrowing from our own citizens. Assume that Americans save $500 billion, far above what they’ve saved recently but perhaps consistent with the changing national mood. Finally, assume that these citizens opt to put all their savings into United States Treasuries (partly through intermediaries like banks).

Even with these heroic assumptions, the Treasury will be obliged to find another $900 billion to finance the remainder of the $1.8 trillion of debt it is issuing. Washington’s printing presses will need to work overtime.

Slowing them down will require extraordinary political will. With government expenditures now running 185 percent of receipts, truly major changes in both taxes and outlays will be required. A revived economy can’t come close to bridging that sort of gap.

Legislators will correctly perceive that either raising taxes or cutting expenditures will threaten their re-election. To avoid this fate, they can opt for high rates of inflation, which never require a recorded vote and cannot be attributed to a specific action that any elected official takes. In fact, John Maynard Keynes long ago laid out a road map for political survival amid an economic disaster of just this sort: “By a continuing process of inflation, governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens…. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.”

I want to emphasize that there is nothing evil or destructive in an increase in debt that is proportional to an increase in income or assets. As the resources of individuals, corporations and countries grow, each can handle more debt. The United States remains by far the most prosperous country on earth, and its debt-carrying capacity will grow in the future just as it has in the past.

But it was a wise man who said, “All I want to know is where I’m going to die so I’ll never go there.” We don’t want our country to evolve into the banana-republic economy described by Keynes.

Our immediate problem is to get our country back on its feet and flourishing — “whatever it takes” still makes sense. Once recovery is gained, however, Congress must end the rise in the debt-to-G.D.P. ratio and keep our growth in obligations in line with our growth in resources.

Unchecked carbon emissions will likely cause icebergs to melt. Unchecked greenback emissions will certainly cause the purchasing power of currency to melt. The dollar’s destiny lies with Congress.

Nice story on Real Estate

August 20, 2009

Peter Linneman on Real Estate: The Storm Is Over, the Wreckage Remains Published : August 19, 2009 in Knowledge@Wharton

Peter Linneman on Real Estate: The Storm Is Over, the Wreckage RemainsAlthough some upbeat economic news in recent weeks might indicate the beginning of the end of the recession, there’s still plenty of “wreckage” to deal with, says Wharton real estate professor Peter D. Linneman. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the housing and commercial property sectors, which have taken one of their worst beatings ever. Linneman refutes the argument that the U. S. government should do more to prop up the weakest parts of the economy, like the troubled real estate industry. In an interview with Knowledge@Wharton, he also draws on policy missteps of the past to caution the Obama administration to tread carefully and avoid “trying to cure things they can’t cure,” while contending that the U. S. might have more in common with countries like Venezuela, Russia and Japan than most observers think.

An edited transcript of the conversation follows.

Knowledge@Wharton: Could we start by taking stock of the real estate market — both housing and commercial. What does it look like to you today and for the rest of the year?

Peter D. Linneman: Let’s take housing first…. Single-family has clearly bottomed. It is the untold story. Single-family housing starts have bottomed and will slowly pick up, [and] single-family housing prices in almost every market have bottomed. For the last four months, single-family housing prices at multiple listing services — namely what real people are selling their homes at instead of foreclosure sales — have been up in almost every market except Las Vegas. So that part is positive, absent further economic collapse driven by Washington.

The multi-family side has fallen off a cliff. Multi-family starts are about a quarter of their historic norm. They’re down 75% in about seven months as a run rate and they’ll stay down because of the shortage of available construction capital. It’s not such a horrible thing because there’s a fair amount of vacancy. What’s happened is that as the economy has lost jobs, people have doubled up. They stay with their parents — [say] young graduates, immigrants stay with their cousins and brothers. That will continue until the economy improves, which probably won’t be until late this year and into next — again, if Washington can just keep calm. Therefore, the lack of construction going on is a good thing in the sense that it means you can eat up excess inventory. It’s not good if you’re in the construction business, but as a general matter it’s good. I see the multi-family [sector] taking longer to pick back up. It won’t pick back up, I think, until next year based on my analyses.

If you ask, is the storm over? The storm is over. What’s left is cleaning up the wreckage from the storm. People have a hard time distinguishing the storm and the wreckage. [There is a]big difference though. When that hurricane is still hitting you, it’s still creating more damage. Now what you’re dealing with on the housing side is all of these people who bought speculative homes. They thought prices would only go up. They thought they’d flip them in six months. There was nobody to flip them to, so of course, they foreclosed. They had no money in it. They didn’t lose anything. That’s probably over half a million homes.

So the wreckage is still being dealt with — [by] the people who were speculators, the people who bought 97%-loan homes even if they were living in them and [the people in] greater Ohio. Greater Ohio is, say, Ohio and 50 miles [just outside] of the Ohio border — that’s in a real recession. It’s been in a real recession for seven years. That’s a different issue than the rest of the country faces.

Unfortunately, the government is trying to cure things it can’t cure. The government is trying to [give] what is not theirs to give. Salvation is not theirs to give, but they’re trying to give salvation. If you had no money in your home, and you thought you would flip it in six months for 100% profit — and then prices fell 20% — salvation [for that business decision] is not the government’s to give. They shouldn’t do it. And the more they try to do it, the more harm than good they’re doing.

Knowledge@Wharton: When you say the storm is over and what’s left is the cleanup, is that just in the U.S. or do you see the same thing internationally?

Linneman: That’s fairly true everywhere. The difference is on the commercial side. It’s true everywhere with the minor exception of China and Brazil, and the very minor exception of India. And when I say that [I mean conditions are] good for Brazil, China and possibly India.

Knowledge@Wharton: How do you see the differences between the way the financial crisis affected the housing market and the commercial market?

Linneman: In one sense, it’s totally different; in another, it’s not. The way [the commercial market] is different [was that] it wasn’t subprime. The Fed kept interest rates at effectively 1% for four years while inflation was running at 2.5%. It guaranteed that anybody who put their money short and safe, lost money for four years. Well, people aren’t going to sit around and lose money for four years. People piled into long and risky.

The common element is what was long and risky. Subprime was long and risky. Certain types of commercial real estate were long and risky. Condominium developments were long and risky, not just in the U.S.: Developments in [India] were long and risky. Leveraged buyouts of operating companies were long and risky. The common element was long and risky [assets], not real estate.

If you look across the world, anything that was long and risky has been crushed because the government went from forcing people artificially to demand long and risky to quite the opposite. It forced them to demand short and safe. When that happened, the supply of long and risky had not changed dramatically. Demand changed dramatically, from being artificially high to [becoming] artificially low. The government also encouraged [buyers] with low interest rates … [making it enticing to borrow] short and float.

You had this odd situation where you were encouraged to invest long but borrow short. It was a disaster that had to end. Anything that was long and risky had the same impact. That’s what’s been lost in the shuffle. People are looking at the symptoms rather than the cause. The cause was low interest rates forcing people to go long and risky. Better to lose money later with a risk than for sure now. It turns out now is the settling up for when you went long and risky.

There’s no similarity between a home [loan] and a commercial real estate [loan]. Commercial real estate has a cash flow behind it. It has tenants behind it, everybody from the U.S. government to a venture capital firm. [Residential] homes have you and me [asking], do we want to stay here? [There is] no cash flow. By the way, the leverage was much higher on the single-family side at the margin. People forget that 20% of all homeowners have no mortgage — no mortgage — in the United States…. Only 5% of all Americans are not current with a mortgage, 33% of Americans rent, 20% have no mortgage and 5% aren’t paying [their mortgage].

There’s an undue focus on a small amount of things, but it’s a very noteworthy amount of things. In that way, they’re similar. The dynamics though are very different in terms of the cash flows, the nature of the mortgages and [the loan] structures.

Knowledge@Wharton: Coming back to the role of the government, you said earlier that it shouldn’t try to do what it can’t do. What is the right strategy for the government now?

Linneman: My view is that [what] government [officials] should have done but didn’t [was to] admit that they are also human beings. Milton Friedman was an old professor of mine and he used to say that when you listen to people talk about the government, if you change the word government to omnipotent deity, the meaning of most sentences would be unchanged. You hear people say the government should help delinquent borrowers. What they really are saying is an omnipotent deity should come in and save them and so forth. They’re just human beings. They have no more information than we do. They have no more expertise than we do. They have powers of mandatory behavior, which are dangerous because I make mistakes everyday at my job. For all we know, this tape is not working. Well, if this tape is not working and it’s just us, it affects two of us. If we’ve committed a similar mistake and we’re in charge of the government, it affects 300 million people.

What they [the government] need to do is admit they’re human, and that they do not have answers. The phrase I’ve used throughout all this is, first, do no harm. If you take a life safety course, the first thing they teach you is to do nothing until you completely understand the situation. We’ve had a government that for the last year has — under both the Bush administration with Paulson and the Obama administration with Geithner — leaped, then looked. They leap to grand solutions, whether it’s TARP or TALF … then two days later they say, “Well, we’re not going to do it that way and by the way we’re changing. “[From] somebody who follows this closely, all [I see that] they’ve done is obliterate rules.

The thing that distinguishes us from Zimbabwe, and distinguishes us from Russia and Venezuela, is that prior to September 1, 2008, you had a fair idea that if a company couldn’t pay its debts, it would go into bankruptcy and the process would work out. You had a fair idea that if a bank couldn’t collect its loans, it would be taken over by the FDIC and liquidated…. Now they’re talking about oil. Will we regulate oil prices? And just on and on, so that you have no certainty at all.

What was the best way to raise money prior to September 1 last year? You went to Wall Street. You made a pitch to investors and you tried to convince them. What’s the best way to make money today? Lose a lot of money and then go to Washington with your political power and try to raise money. That can’t be good because I don’t know who is politically powerful enough. So they’ve ruined the playing field. People do not play games if they don’t know the rules. That’s why Zimbabwe, Venezuela and Russia have weaker economies — nobody knows the rules. I don’t even have to like the rules. You and I play games all the time that we think have stupid rules. But as long as we know the rules, we’ll play.

We changed from the most predictable rules in the world to [a] Russia-Venezuela [approach]. If you don’t believe it, suppose I told you the Duma in Russia conducted hearings for two weeks on whether to subsidize, to the tune of tens of billions of dollars, a couple of companies? After two weeks they said no. The next day Putin said yes. You’d say, “Well, that’s Russia. And that’s why I don’t invest in Russia. “

That’s literally what happened in November to the auto industry. Congress conducted hearings. They said no. Twelve hours later, the Secretary of the Treasury said, “We’ll do it anyway. “

I’m not picking on Democrats or Republicans. Unfortunately, this has crossed the party line. What they really need to do is — less. Unfortunately, that is not what they’re good at.

Knowledge@Wharton: Let’s look back about 20 years [when] the savings and loan debacle happened. The government agency called in the Resolution Trust Corporation, or RTC, to solve, at that time, what looked like a big mess, and Wall Street, securitization and real estate investment trusts [REITS] emerged as a solution. As this scenario plays out with real estate finance, and housing and commercial real estate, where do you see the sources of capital [coming from] and what will the landscape look like?

Linneman: There is a great similarity between what happened then and [what is] happening now…. One, human nature. Human nature then said things only go up and we believed our own [lies]. One of the things that happens at the end of every cycle, by the way, is that human nature takes over, so it’s not the first time human nature has taken over. In all of history utopist go around saying, “I’m going to change human nature. “You’re not going to change human nature. You’re not going to regulate human nature out of existence. Madoff is not the first guy to steal. Wars have been going on since the dawn of man. Murder has been going on. And so have economic ups and downs because of the hubris of people. That was a bust of hubris.

The difference was the government then said, “We are going to live by the rules. If you’re not solvent, we’re going to shut you down. “Did they make some mistakes with hindsight of shutting down a few people who were solvent? Yes. And the courts later resolved that. There were so many of them that were insolvent, they had to liquidate them and set up a special agency.

Instead of doing that this time, the government has said, “We can decide how to keep people alive. “Instead of shutting down the insolvent, they’ve kept the insolvent [institutions] alive and pumped in billions of dollars. Think about it. There’s only so much money and capital in the system. If you give money to insolvent people, all you’re guaranteeing is that the solvent aren’t getting the money. There’s only so much. My analogy is that if you give blood transfusions to the dead, they’re not only not going to get up and dance the jig, but there won’t be any blood to give to those who are still alive and could benefit from it. That was the big mistake we made this time.

You mentioned securitization. Securitization came to the rescue of Latin American debt if you think about it. Back with the Brady bonds, it came to the rescue of the S&L crisis — namely, we’ll package stuff up both in terms of debt and equity. The equity side has proven pretty successful. Yes, the stock prices fell. Hey, stock prices of everything fell. REITS stock prices fell more than the prices of other stocks for one simple reason — that in normal times, they have a beta of about 0.5. They aren’t perfectly correlated. Therefore, people are willing to pay a premium for something that’s not perfectly correlated. When people rush for the fire escape, everything is perfectly correlated. Not only does it go down as much as everything else, no longer are you getting a premium for the fact it doesn’t. It actually has to fall more. The flip side is going to be … it will go back up more until the next time we rush to the fire escape. And we will rush to the fire escape again within the next ten years because we’re human.

How will capital sources come? They will be equity, not debt. It will, in the near term, be a massive debt-for-equity swap. People say we’re over-levered…. At the face value of the debt we are, but not at the current market valuation. It’s a little like saying I put $100 million into my stocks. Of course, they’re worth $20 million today and you’re still saying, “No, they’re worth $100 million. “No they aren’t. They’re worth $20 million. In the same sense, if you look at the market value of the debt, whether you trace it through the banks, through what’s traded or through [commercial mortgage-backed securities or residential mortgage-backed securities], we’re not over-levered.

What we are is over-face valued, which means — because debt is a contract — you’ve got a lot of contracts that have to be worked out. Whereas equity says no workouts; it’s just down. It’s great for lawyers, bad for everybody else. Where will the money come from? It will come from public capital markets first. The REITS are the best position to take advantage of this because they’re around, they’re loaded, they’re low leverage, they’re transparent and they’re name brands. The private equity funds will take advantage of it. It’s more difficult because they’ve told investors that they are going to get 20% to 25% returns. It’s very hard to make a pro forma show a 20% to 25% return on a cash stream — any cash stream — without a lot of leverage. So the absence of leverage means you can get 12, 15, 18% on paper, but not [in the 20% range]. And that’s a challenge for private equity. In fact, any time you can do a pro forma and generate a 20%, you will never do it. Any time you can’t do a pro forma that generates 20%, you might be able to do it because it means capital is scarce.

What you’ll see is a lot of equitization though. You’ll probably see some private equity funds go public, for example, [and] use that money to pay down debt … and restructure in that way….

You are going to see banks sell assets. It’s going to go a lot slower than people think because this time the U.S. government is acting much more like Japan did in the early 1990s, which was very slow to shut down the insolvent [Japanese banks]. We are giving blood to the dead, rather than giving blood to the living. If we do that, they have less incentive to [sell] assets, create a market and move on.

Knowledge@Wharton: What will real estate look like and what should it look like in the future?

Linneman: What it will look like in the future is pretty obvious — ups and downs, with more up than down. Probably 60% to 70% up and 30% down — but the downs being right when you think they’re impossible to occur and the ups occurring just when you think they’ll never occur. As I was saying to some friends at a gathering that I host, of major real estate people, if you go back to 1997, before the Russian ruble crisis, nobody saw the extent of the collapse. Some people saw there was weakness, but nobody saw the extent. At the bottom post-Russian ruble crisis, nobody saw the height of dot-com, which was two years later in terms of valuation and froth. At the height of the dot-com, nobody saw that two years later you’d be in the depths of 9/11. You may have seen a down, but not the depths. In the depths of post 9/11, nobody saw 2005 being as strong as it was. As you sat in 2005, nobody saw the first quarter of 2007 being as frothy as it was. In the first quarter of 2007, no one saw the depths we’re in now.

Why do you believe any of us when we sit here and say anything, because even those of us who have been pretty good at predicting, have only predicted direction and generally missed magnitude? I predicted a recession five years ago and every quarter thereafter for 2009. So great. I was right. I predicted flat GDP and a 1.5 million job losses. I was only off by 4.5 million jobs and I was only off by 6% of GDP. Other than that, I was a genius, right? The point being, even those of us who got directions right, missed magnitude.

We need to have some humility and understanding. We’re going to be very wrong about the next two years. The next two years are going to see a lot of asset price appreciation, particularly related to real estate. You’re going to see better economic performance than people are foreseeing. If you look at past recessions, that’s always turned out to be the case.

The real estate industry [is] probably going to have a great four years for public companies, including companies that aren’t … [yet] public. You’re going to see a number of private equity funds struggle, some [just] to stay in existence because they are heavier debt. Let’s face it. Anybody who used debt is caught up in that negotiation game. And if all your energies are caught in the negotiation, you’re not in the create-new-value game. You only have so much time and energy.

What you’re going to see is those who had low debt, which are going to be a few families but mostly public companies, are going to see their timeAnd private funds, and the heavily leveraged, will have the opposite [experience].

Will securitization arise? Some version of it, yes. Do I know exactly what version? No. There’s probably some 35-year-old out there who is figuring out the new answer that will be the end of history. And then five years later, [it will turn out that] it’s not the end of history. One of the advantages of being old is you realize, every solution creates its own problem.

But [the solution] did solve a problem at the moment. I’ll deal with the [new] problem five years from now. I’ll be happy to deal with the problem of five years from now if I can just solve the problem today. If you think about life, that’s how we go through life as. I solved the problem of today. Are you working on the article of five years from now? [Or do you think,] “Hey, I got enough problems just getting the articles of today together.” Sort of similar, right?

What you’ll see though is that securitization is not going to go away. People are saying, “We should do this regulation or we should not allow this or not allow that. “Trust me. If you read the literature that people — intelligent people doing thoughtful analysis — wrote as securitization was occurring, not just in real estate, it said, “Look at all the problems it’s solving. Yes, it does have a few drawbacks, but… “Well, as things gain momentum, the “buts” come to dominate the benefits. In the beginning, it’s easy to get the benefits to dominate the “buts. “As we push things and we start believing our own [public relations] and our hubris sets in, we push the margins….

There is a myth [that] securitization created this problem. It’s not true. What created the problem was bad risk analysis, whether it was bad risk analysis on the equity side or bad risk analysis on the debt side. A loan to somebody to flip an apartment when there are 50 apartments that [are ready to move into] and there are 500 [apartments] being delivered in a year — if you give 100% loan on that, that’s a bad loan because it was badly underwritten, whether it’s securitized or held as private loan, or even if it’s bought with 100% equity. It’s bad risk analysis. Fifty are needed. And 500 are being built. That’s ten years’ worth. If you’re pouring money into that, that’s bad….

Bad risk analysis generally goes with either the end of a cycle — when we start believing ourselves — or bad policy. The bad policy was the 1% interest rate, which made things look better than they should have as an alternative.

By the way, do I think the Fed will never make another monetary policy mistake? It was an honest mistake. It certainly wasn’t a dishonest mistake. Of course, they’re going to make more mistakes because they’re just human beings. So securitization isn’t what is wrong. Japan, in the 1980s, made the greatest number of insane loans with the worst risk analysis and the worst documentation in modern history. None of them were securitized. They were all held on balance sheets…. The packaging of it influences it at the margin. But bad decisions are bad decisions, no matter how you package them.

Knowledge@Wharton: The argument that some people might have is that with securitization you don’t have to hold the risk. You can move it to somebody else.

Linneman: The old joke was — this is in the old loan world when you didn’t securitize — I make the loan and then if it doesn’t work, I pretend it’s good until either I get promoted or retire. Right? That was it. So the institution in some sense held it. But when you get to where the rubber meets the road, it’s human beings. And human beings have the incentive to not take the responsibility for their own mistakes. We have the human being dimension to take all the responsibility for any success we’re remotely [close to], including success we have nothing to do with. Failure [has] no parents and success [has] a thousand fathers. These are old sayings for a reason. When [these loans] were held as whole loans, or when they were done as equity, dot-com had relatively little debt, was some of the worst risk analysis ever. Hundreds of billions of dollars [were] wasted on bad risk analysis.

By the way, if we had done it as debt rather than equity, would it have been any smarter if we’d have held them as whole loans rather than equity. Dumb is dumb as [far as] risk analysis [goes]. And the packaging can influence [the risk profile], but it’s secondary. The truth is, you saw relatively few people with 100% of their own money making really dumb decisions — in any of these. What you always see is a lot of people, with other people’s money [making bad decisions], and an incentive structure [to further encourage those decisions].

Because we’re human beings with flawed integrity and the ability to tell ourselves we’re doing the right things even when we’re not, one of our greatest abilities is deluding ourselves. I look in the mirror every morning and I see John Wayne at his best. It gets me through the day. You see the storybook here. We all delude [ourselves]. People are focusing on the package it [these loans] came in. I’ve got bad incentives whether I’m holding the loans on and I’m trying to get my bonus that year or I’m trying to sell them and get my bonus. It may be more transparent one way over the other.

Securitization made the problem visible about two years earlier than it did in Japan when it was private, and than it did in the S&Ls when it was behind closed doors. I shudder to think how big the mistakes would have grown to if they had have been behind closed doors instead of securitized.

Knowledge@Wharton: What are the main lessons that we should learn from this experience?

Linneman: Great lessons. One: Whenever there’s more money being offered to you than you can imagine, it will be followed by a period where nobody’s going to offer you money. Another lesson:Don’t match long assets with short liabilities. These aren’t rocket-science lessons, but they are lessons.

Third:Debt has risk. Normally, and too often, people only think debt has a price, but not a risk. A lot of people say, “Debt is cheaper than equity. “Do you understand how many people paid as the cost of their debt — not the interest rate — they paid all their equity. I put in 20% equity on a purchase. The interest rate was 4%. It ended up costing me one year of 4% interest and 20%. It cost me 100% of my equity…. The biggest risk of debt is not that the interest rate goes up. The biggest risk of debt has always been — I wrote this in my book years ago — [that] they don’t want to give you money when your debt is due…. This is not the first time it’s happened. It’s interesting. I’m 58 and in the last 31 years I counted five times when economic events that supposedly only happen once every 100 years have occurred. Must have been a good 31 years, you know? .

This stuff happens and it happens because we’re human. That’s the last lesson. We are human. And they’re talking about more regulations. We don’t need more regulations. We just need to enforce the regulations we have. We have regulations that date back to the 1930s that say no federally insured depository can exist unless it can demonstrate safety and soundness. And we pay regulators — we have paid regulators — to enforce that. I think they missed. Now, I’m not even blaming them. Remember, the burden of proof is you don’t get a government insured deposit license unless you can demonstrate safety and soundness. It’s pretty obvious they weren’t safe and sound. The law was there and I’m not even faulting human beings. Again, they’re human beings on the regulating side as well.

The notion that you can regulate people into good behavior — we’ve got more regulations. It reminds me of the tragedies of gun control. Every time somebody walks into a McDonald’s, a post office or a school and kills … people with a handgun, you know that the next day there will be cries for more gun control. Every state in the country has probably 14 inches of gun control laws because every time [new legislators are voted into office], they pass an addition. What we need to do is to enforce the gun control laws, which say children, criminals and mentally unstable should not have access to them. All those laws already exist. Forget more regulation. Just enforce the ones we already have. All that more regulation can do … is make it harder to enforce, because I am going to have to spend a year figuring out what they mean. Now instead of 14 inches, I have 28 inches of regulation and I can’t pay attention to all of them.

Madoff is not a matter of market failure. Madoff is a matter of regulatory failure — over four administrations. The guy was a thief. Do we need new laws against thieves? There have been laws against thieves as [long] as mankind [has had laws]. Yet there are always thieves. The issue is having the will to enforce what you have. It’s rare that we’re passing a law that is truly improving on the fundamentals of the Ten Commandments or the Koran or whatever. They figured it out then. Don’t lie. Don’t steal. Let’s just have it real simple. What we need is a dedicated enforcement effort that takes it seriously. That’s difficult to do because it takes a human will that’s generally not there. We’re not inventing anything new. We’re just reliving. One hundred years from now this will all just be history. It’s just like reading about World War I. It happened over there, a whole bunch of people got hurt and some died. It was a great tragedy. But it will just be history. We’re just living history and it’s just going to keep repeating itself in variations. At least that’s my view.

Marc Faber Comments from August Newsletter

August 3, 2009

Marc Faber just released an excellent analysis of current market conditions through his newsletter service. The gist of it is the following: 1) the rally in equities is reaching a near term top, but after a correction equities could continue to rally, 2) strength in equities has nothing to do with any improvement in economic conditions and everything to do with money printing and zero interest rates, 3) equities may continue to rally for a while longer after a correction exactly because the economy is not recovering and even more money will be printed and spent by the government in a futile attempt to create economic growth, 4) gold and other hard assets are still good but may not outperform in the short run, 5) high quality equities and corporate bonds are much better than long term government bonds or cash, 6) Asian equities are much better than other equities, 7) all of this is in the context of a long term US bear market that will take many more years to run its course (i.e. think Japan in the 1990’s).

Bill Gross’ August Commentary

July 31, 2009
http://www.pimco.com/LeftNav/Featured+Market+Commentary/IO/2009/Investment+Outlook+August+2009+Gross+Investment+Potion.htm

Investment Outlook

Bill Gross | August 2009
Investment Potions

I took my troubles down to Madame Rue
You know that gypsy with the gold-capped tooth
She’s got a pad down on 34th and Vine
Sellin’ little bottles of – Love Potion #9
                                        – Love Potion #9, Circa 1959
 

I’ve never known any gold-capped tooth money managers, but without squinting very hard there is undoubtedly a strong resemblance between all of us “managers” and the infamous Madame Rue selling Potion #9. Instead of love, though, we sell “hope,” but very few are able to seal the deal with performance anywhere close to compensating for the generous fees we command. Hope has a legitimate price, of course, even if its promises are never fulfilled. It is the reason we put a five spot into the collection plate on Sunday mornings and why we risk a 25-dollar chip at the blackjack table. In the former case we usually rationalize it as “insurance,” and with the latter as “entertainment.” Whatever – I’ve already alienated all of you with strong faith in the hereafter or the ones who actually believe they’re going to win on their next trip to Las Vegas. But my point is that those who sell investment “potions” must wrap their product with an extra large ribbon because history is not on their side. Common sense would dictate that the industry as a whole cannot outperform the market because they are the market, and long-term statistics revealing negative alpha for the class of active managers confirms it. Yet, what a price investors are willing to pay! A recent Barron’s article pointed out that stock funds extract an average 99 basis points or virtually 1% a year in fees from an investor’s portfolio. Bond managers are more benevolent (or less pretentious) at 75 basis points, and many money market funds manage to subsist at a miserly 38. Still, those 38 basis points are as deceptive as the pea that disappears beneath the shell of a street-side con game. Since money market funds barely earn 38 basis points these days, much of the return winds up in the hands of investment managers. A mighty expensive potion indeed. While some index and ETF proponents avoid this extreme absurdity with lower fees, roughly 90% of the $1.5 trillion in 401(k) and other defined contribution assets in mutual funds are in actively managed offerings with expenses close to 1%. Paying for those potions during an era of asset appreciation with double-digit returns may have been tolerable, but if investment returns gravitate close to 6% as envisaged in PIMCO’s “new normal,” then 15% of your income will be extracted based on the beguiling promise of Madame Rue. The solution, of course, is to compare long-term performance with fees and approach 34th & Vine with informed confidence, as opposed to Pollyannaish hope that you’ll get your money’s worth. Down the hatch and good luck!

Investors looking for love potions or successful investment strategies in this new normal economy dominated by deleveraging and reregulation must focus on some very macro-oriented ingredients as opposed to typical news-dominated minutiae. The latest quarterly earnings report from Goldman Sachs may be an indicator that the financial sector is getting some color in its cheeks, but it doesn’t really let you know what needs to happen in order for the real economy to stabilize as well. My last month’s Investment Outlook commentary on the significance of wage and employment trends remains the key focus. Common sense tells us that consumer spending growth comes from highly employed, well-compensated labor, and we are far-far from even approaching that elemental condition. The fact is that near double-digit unemployment has resulted from numerous business models that are now broken: autos, home construction, commercial real estate development, finance, and retail sales. Construction of a new Humpty Dumpty capitalistic “oeuf” will be a herculean task.

Potion hunters, however, should also understand the following macro concept that will dominate the indefinite future, one which I will humbly try to explain in the next few pages in 500 words or less: Reflating nominal GDP by inflating asset prices is the fundamental, yet infrequently acknowledged, goal of policymakers. If they can do that, then employment and economic stability may ultimately follow.

To explain:
A country’s GDP or Gross Domestic Product is really just an annual total of the goods and services that have been produced by its existing stock of investment (capital in the form of plant, equipment, software and certain intangibles) and labor (people working). Over the last 15 years or so in the U.S. that annual production (GDP) has increased in nominal (real growth and inflation) terms of 5-7% as shown in Chart 1.  Not every year, certainly not in boom or recessionary years, but pretty steadily over longer timeframes, and consistently enough to signal to capitalists that 5% was the number they could count on to justify employment hiring, investment spending plans, and which would serve as well as a close proxy for the return on capital that they should expect. Nominal GDP is in fact a decent proxy for a national economy’s return on capital. If each and every year we grew by 5%, then that would be sort of like a stock whose earnings grew by the same amount. Companies and investors then would be able to estimate the present value of those cash flows, and price investment and related assets accordingly – a capital asset pricing model or CAPM based on nominal GDP expectations.

While objectively hard to prove, logic dictates that that is exactly what has happened over the past several decades. Businesses expanded with a developing certainty that demand, expenses, and return on the economy’s capital would mimic this 5% consistency. Debt was issued with yields that reflected the ability to service those payments through 5% growth in both real and inflationary terms, and stocks were issued and priced as well with the same foundation. Pension obligations and similar liabilities were legitimized on comparable logic, as were government spending programs forecasting tax revenues and benefits. Both real economy and financial markets then, were geared to and, in fact, mesmerized by this 5%, GDP/CAPM, “model.”

Now, however, things have changed, and it is apparent that there is massive overcapacity in the U.S. and indeed the global economy. As reflexive delevering has unveiled the ugly stepsister of the “great 5% moderation,” nominal GDP has not only sunk below 5%, but turned at least temporarily negative. If allowed to continue – and this is my critical point – a portion of the U.S. production capacity and labor market will have to be permanently laid off. Nominal GDP has to grow close to 5% in order for the economy’s long-term balance to be maintained. Otherwise, employment levels become unsustainable, retail shopping centers unserviceable, automobile production facilities unprofitable, and the economy itself heads towards a new normal where unemployment averages 8 instead of 5%, housing starts total 1.5 instead of 2 million, and domestic auto sales 12, instead of 16 million annual units. Critically in the readjustment process, debts are haircutted via corporate defaults and home foreclosures, and equity P/Es are cut based upon increased risk and substantially lower growth expectations. A virtuous circle of expansion turns into a vicious cycle of recession or low-growth stagnation. Label it what you will, but a modern capitalistic economy based on levered financing and asset appreciation cannot thrive if its “return on capital” or nominal GDP suffers such a significant shock.

Policymakers/government to the rescue –we hope. 0% interest rates, quantitative easing, $1.5 trillion deficits, trillions more in FDIC or explicit government guarantees, a trillion plus in MBS and Treasury bond purchases, TALF, TARP – I could, but I need not go on. Can they do it? In other words, can they successfully reflate to 5% nominal GDP and recreate an “old” normal economy? Not likely. The substitution of government-backed vs. private-leverage is one strong argument against the possibility. Despite the attractive financing rates incorporated with the TALF, TLGP and other government-subsidized financing programs, they come with quality constraints (larger collateral haircuts and mortgage down payments, to name a few) that inhibit the “new normal” lenders from approaching the standards of the 5% nominal-based shadow banking system. Just last week, President Obama proposed new “transaction fees” for “far out transactions” undertaken by financial companies. “If you guys want to do them,” he said, “put something into the kitty.” In turn, there are internal Washington Beltway/external Main Street USA, politically imposed limits which will thwart policy expansion beyond the current stasis. Most of the politicos and even ordinary citizens are screaming for limits on monetary/fiscal expansion: “No TARP II! 1.5 trillion dollar deficits are enough! The Fed must have an exit plan!” etc. If there are such future political constraints or caps (both domestically and from abroad), then one should recognize that most of the ammunition has been spent stabilizing the financial system, and very little directed towards the real economy in terms of job loss prevention. Where is the political will or wallet now to grant corporate tax breaks for private sector job creation or to even hire new government workers, aside from a minor positive push with military enlistment? In brief, the “new normal” nominal GDP, the future return on our stock of labor and capital investment, will likely be centered closer to 3%, for at least a few years once a recovery is in place beginning in this year’s second half. Diminished capitalistic risk taking and constrained policymaker releveraging will lead to that likely conclusion.

Investment conclusions? A 3% nominal GDP “new normal” means lower profit growth, permanently higher unemployment, capped consumer spending growth rates and an increasing involvement of the government sector, which substantially changes the character of the American capitalistic model. High risk bonds, commercial real estate, and even lower quality municipal bonds may suffer more than cyclical defaults if not government supported. Stock P/Es will rest at lower historical norms, and higher stock prices will ultimately depend on tangible earnings growth in the form of increased dividends, not green shoots hope. An investor should remember that a journey to 3% nominal GDP means default/haircuts for assets on the upper end of the risk spectrum, as well as extremely low yielding returns for government and government-guaranteed assets at the bottom end. There is no investment potion for this new environment other than steady income-producing bond and equity investments in companies with strong balance sheets and high dividend yields, as well as selectively chosen emerging market commitments where nominal GDP growth prospects are tilted upward as opposed to gravitating to new lower norms. Madame Rue has met her match.

William H. Gross
Managing Director

Stocks/Industries to buy during every part of economic cycle

July 27, 2009

From realmoney.com and S&P

stockstobuyandwhen-economiccycles

The Fed’s Farewell?

July 21, 2009

op ed in WSJ today from Bernake:

 

 

  • OPINION
  • JULY 21, 2009, 8:13 A.M. ET

The Fed’s Exit Strategy

  • smaller Text larger
  • By BEN BERNANKE

    The depth and breadth of the global recession has required a highly accommodative monetary policy. Since the onset of the financial crisis nearly two years ago, the Federal Reserve has reduced the interest-rate target for overnight lending between banks (the federal-funds rate) nearly to zero. We have also greatly expanded the size of the Fed’s balance sheet through purchases of longer-term securities and through targeted lending programs aimed at restarting the flow of credit.

    These actions have softened the economic impact of the financial crisis. They have also improved the functioning of key credit markets, including the markets for interbank lending, commercial paper, consumer and small-business credit, and residential mortgages.

    My colleagues and I believe that accommodative policies will likely be warranted for an extended period. At some point, however, as economic recovery takes hold, we will need to tighten monetary policy to prevent the emergence of an inflation problem down the road. The Federal Open Market Committee, which is responsible for setting U.S. monetary policy, has devoted considerable time to issues relating to an exit strategy. We are confident we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation, when that becomes appropriate, in a smooth and timely manner.

    Chad Crowe

    The exit strategy is closely tied to the management of the Federal Reserve balance sheet. When the Fed makes loans or acquires securities, the funds enter the banking system and ultimately appear in the reserve accounts held at the Fed by banks and other depository institutions. These reserve balances now total about $800 billion, much more than normal. And given the current economic conditions, banks have generally held their reserves as balances at the Fed.

    But as the economy recovers, banks should find more opportunities to lend out their reserves. That would produce faster growth in broad money (for example, M1 or M2) and easier credit conditions, which could ultimately result in inflationary pressures—unless we adopt countervailing policy measures. When the time comes to tighten monetary policy, we must either eliminate these large reserve balances or, if they remain, neutralize any potential undesired effects on the economy.

    To some extent, reserves held by banks at the Fed will contract automatically, as improving financial conditions lead to reduced use of our short-term lending facilities, and ultimately to their wind down. Indeed, short-term credit extended by the Fed to financial institutions and other market participants has already fallen to less than $600 billion as of mid-July from about $1.5 trillion at the end of 2008. In addition, reserves could be reduced by about $100 billion to $200 billion each year over the next few years as securities held by the Fed mature or are prepaid. However, reserves likely would remain quite high for several years unless additional policies are undertaken.

    Even if our balance sheet stays large for a while, we have two broad means of tightening monetary policy at the appropriate time: paying interest on reserve balances and taking various actions that reduce the stock of reserves. We could use either of these approaches alone; however, to ensure effectiveness, we likely would use both in combination.

    Congress granted us authority last fall to pay interest on balances held by banks at the Fed. Currently, we pay banks an interest rate of 0.25%. When the time comes to tighten policy, we can raise the rate paid on reserve balances as we increase our target for the federal funds rate.

    Banks generally will not lend funds in the money market at an interest rate lower than the rate they can earn risk-free at the Federal Reserve. Moreover, they should compete to borrow any funds that are offered in private markets at rates below the interest rate on reserve balances because, by so doing, they can earn a spread without risk.

    Thus the interest rate that the Fed pays should tend to put a floor under short-term market rates, including our policy target, the federal-funds rate. Raising the rate paid on reserve balances also discourages excessive growth in money or credit, because banks will not want to lend out their reserves at rates below what they can earn at the Fed.

    Considerable international experience suggests that paying interest on reserves effectively manages short-term market rates. For example, the European Central Bank allows banks to place excess reserves in an interest-paying deposit facility. Even as that central bank’s liquidity-operations substantially increased its balance sheet, the overnight interbank rate remained at or above its deposit rate. In addition, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of Canada have also used their ability to pay interest on reserves to maintain a floor under short-term market rates.

     

    Despite this logic and experience, the federal-funds rate has dipped somewhat below the rate paid by the Fed, especially in October and November 2008, when the Fed first began to pay interest on reserves. This pattern partly reflected temporary factors, such as banks’ inexperience with the new system.

    However, this pattern appears also to have resulted from the fact that some large lenders in the federal-funds market, notably government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are ineligible to receive interest on balances held at the Fed, and thus they have an incentive to lend in that market at rates below what the Fed pays banks.

    Under more normal financial conditions, the willingness of banks to engage in the simple arbitrage noted above will tend to limit the gap between the federal-funds rate and the rate the Fed pays on reserves. If that gap persists, the problem can be addressed by supplementing payment of interest on reserves with steps to reduce reserves and drain excess liquidity from markets—the second means of tightening monetary policy. Here are four options for doing this.

    First, the Federal Reserve could drain bank reserves and reduce the excess liquidity at other institutions by arranging large-scale reverse repurchase agreements with financial market participants, including banks, government-sponsored enterprises and other institutions. Reverse repurchase agreements involve the sale by the Fed of securities from its portfolio with an agreement to buy the securities back at a slightly higher price at a later date.

    Second, the Treasury could sell bills and deposit the proceeds with the Federal Reserve. When purchasers pay for the securities, the Treasury’s account at the Federal Reserve rises and reserve balances decline.

    The Treasury has been conducting such operations since last fall under its Supplementary Financing Program. Although the Treasury’s operations are helpful, to protect the independence of monetary policy, we must take care to ensure that we can achieve our policy objectives without reliance on the Treasury.

    Third, using the authority Congress gave us to pay interest on banks’ balances at the Fed, we can offer term deposits to banks—analogous to the certificates of deposit that banks offer their customers. Bank funds held in term deposits at the Fed would not be available for the federal funds market.

    Fourth, if necessary, the Fed could reduce reserves by selling a portion of its holdings of long-term securities into the open market.

    Each of these policies would help to raise short-term interest rates and limit the growth of broad measures of money and credit, thereby tightening monetary policy.

    Overall, the Federal Reserve has many effective tools to tighten monetary policy when the economic outlook requires us to do so. As my colleagues and I have stated, however, economic conditions are not likely to warrant tighter monetary policy for an extended period. We will calibrate the timing and pace of any future tightening, together with the mix of tools to best foster our dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability.

    —Mr. Bernanke is chairman of the Federal Reserve.